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	 	 In	 the	 normally	 restrained	 world	 of	 academic	 discourse,	 the	
Anderson–Thompson	debate	stands	out	as	a	break	with	the	dominant	culture	of	self-
abnegation	and	humility.	Over	the	course	of	three	years	(1964–1966),	noted	Marxist	
historians	 Perry	 Thompson	 and	 Edward	 Thompson	 launched	 a	 series	 of	 spirited	
attacks	on	each	other	that	reach	a	level	of	virulence	rarely	approached	in	scholarly	












in	 this	 paper	 that	 the	 issues	 raised	 by	 Anderson	 and	 Thompson	 deserve	 to	 be	
repositioned	at	 the	center	of	 the	comparative–historical	project.	 In	 the	process,	 I	
will	position	Anderson	and	Thompson	against	four	other	luminaries	of	comparative	
historical	 sociology:	 Charles	 Tilly,	 Immanuel	 Wallerstein,	 Theda	 Skocpol,	 and	
Craig	Calhoun,	all	of	whom	have	weighed	 in	on	 the	debate	 (Tilly	and	Wallerstein	
lean	 towards	 Thompson,	 while	 Skocpol	 and	 Calhoun	 are	 more	 sympathetic	 to	






	 Edward	 Thompson	 was	 not,	 strictly	 speaking,	 a	 comparative	
historian.		Thompson’s	best	known	and	most-cited	work,	The Making of the English 
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Working Class,	 is	not	a	comparative	study	at	all.	 Instead,	it	 is	a	lengthy	exposition	
of	working	 class	 development	 in	 a	 single nation,	 spanning	 a	 seven-hundred-year	
period.	 	 Thompson’s	 writing	 style	 usually	 approximates	 what	 a	 historian	 might	
term	 “thick	 description”—a	 painstakingly	 detailed	 narrative	 which	 attempts	 to	














	 Three	 fundamental	 theses	 sustain	MEWC.	 The	 first	 is	 co-determination,	
or	the	notion	that	the	working	class	“made	itself	as	much	as	 it	was	made.”	Here,	
Thompson	 is	 clearly	 challenging	 the	myth	of	a	meek,	 submissive	English	working	
class.	He	observes	that	although	British	working-class	movements	never	coalesced	
into	a	party,	and	although	their	revolutionary	efforts	were	abortive	at	best,	British	
history	 is	 checkered	 with	 working-class	 riots,	 revolts,	 uprisings,	 and	 rebellions.	
The	 apparent	 timidity	 of	 working-class	 movements	 is	 as	 much	 a	 consequences	
of	 extraneous	 historical	 conditions	 as	 endogenous	 inadequacies.	 Indeed,	 much	
of	MEWC	 is	 devoted	 to	 chronicling	 the	 forgotten	 history	 of	 British	working-class	
movements,	as	if	to	defend	them	in	the	tribunal	of	history.
	 Thompson’s	second	thesis,	consciousness,	 is	the	idea	that	“class	happens	
where	 some	 men,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 common	 experiences,	 feel	 and	 articulate	 the	
identity	 of	 their	 interests	 as	 between	 themselves,	 and	 as	 against	 other	 men”	




to	be	missing	 from	 traditional	 accounts	 of	 class	 formation:	 ideology	 and	 culture.	











	 The	 20-mile	 channel	 separating	 Britain	 from	 continental	 Europe	may	 as	
well	be	an	ocean:	Britain	 lags	behind	the	rest	of	Western	Europe	on	nearly	every	








be	 sure,	Gaullist	 France	was	 no	workers’	 paradise	 either,	 but	 the	 Socialist	 (SFIO)	
and	Communist	 (PCF)	Parties	remained	viable	oppositional	 forces	throughout	the	
1960s,	and	both	were	far	to	the	left	of	Britain’s	Labour.	More	to	the	point,	the	French	
labor	movement	 in	 the	 1960s	was	 the	 envy	 of	 union	militants	worldwide,	while	
British	unions	were	relatively	quiescent.	In	Anderson’s	admiration	for	the	militancy	
and	 (relative)	 successes	of	 the	French	working	 class,	 his	 Francophilia	 is	 palpable.	
Anderson	embodies	the	stereotypical	self-hating	Brit.4











purity	 in	three	respects:	 (1)	 the	French	bourgeoisie	at	 the	time	of	 the	Revolution	
was	 fully	 developed	 and	 provided	 an	 appropriate	 target	 for	 proletarian	 rage;	 (2)	
the	social	democratic	state	that	emerged	after	the	Jacobins	was	an	ideal	model	for	




“holistic	 integrity,	 functional	 systematicity,	 and	 continuity”	 (Skocpol	 1984:	 32).	 In	




he	 does	 not	 dispute	 the	 essential	 facts	 of	 Thompson’s	 exhaustive	 account,	 he	
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is	 dismissive	 of	 movements	 that	 result	 in	 failure,	 whatever	 their	 potential.	 Put	
simply,	 Anderson	 is	 far	 more	 interested	 in	 outcomes	 than	 in	 process.	 Most	
fundamentally,	Anderson	disputes	Thompson’s	concept	of	class,	which	he	considers	
insufficiently	 economic.	 Anderson	writes:	 “The	 thrust	 of	 [Thompson’s]	 argument	





relation	 to	 the	means	 of	 production,	 independent	 of	will	 or	 attitude”	 (Anderson	
1980:	38).		Here,	Anderson	quotes	G.	W.	Cohen	who	argues	that	“a	person’s	class	is	
established	by	nothing	but	his	objective	place	in	the	network	of	ownership	relations	
…	His	 consciousness,	 culture	 and	 politics	 do	 not	 enter	 the	 definition	 of	 his	 class	
position”	(Cohen	1978:	73).			(As	usual,	Anderson	is	probably	overstating	his	case	in	
this	passage	for	the	sake	of	polemic.)		Finally,	Anderson	criticizes	Thompson’s	notion	
that	 class	 struggle	 might	 exist	 without	 class	 per se.	 For	 Anderson,	 Thompson’s	
definition	of	class	is	far	too	“voluntarist	and	subjectivist,”	for	“classes	have	frequently	
existed	whose	members	did	not	identify	their	antagonistic	interests	in	any	process	
of	 common	 struggle”	 (Anderson	 1980:	 40).	 Put	 differently,	 Anderson	 posits	 that	
classes	exist	objectively—even	when	people	fail	to	behave	in	class	ways.
	 Anderson’s	 “Origins”	 is	 essentially	 a	 two-case	 comparison	 between	 the	
“British	model”	and	the	“French	model.”	Although	Anderson	frequently	refers	to	the	
“continental”	 pattern,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 “continental”	 is	merely	 a	 proxy	 for	 “French,”	
since	 Germany	 and	 Italy	 are	 themselves	 merely	 inferior	 approximations	 of	 the	
French	pattern.	Moreover,	Anderson	positions	the	French	model	at	the	center	of	his	
analysis.	Even	though	he	spills	more	ink	discussing	the	British	pattern,	this	is	mainly	
for	 the	 purpose	 of	 illuminating	 its	 inadequacies	 as	 against	 the	 French	 example	 of	
revolutionary	 perfection.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 French	 pattern	 is	 ideal-typical	 (in	 the	
normative	 sense	 of	 the	 term);	 it	 is	 the	model	 against	which	 all	 other	 possibilities	







of	 Anderson’s	 historiographical	 assumptions—especially	 his	 periodization.5	 But	
Thompson’s	main	 line	of	(counter-)attack	 is	methodological.	He	claims	that	cross-
national	 comparisons	 are	 only	 meaningful	 insofar	 as	 pre-existing	 conditions	 are	
themselves	comparable.	In	other	words,	the	French	model	cannot	be	meaningfully	
applied	to	foreign	turf.	Given	Britain’s	unique	class	structure,	agrarian	population,	
geographical	 isolation,	 and	 a	 host	 of	 other	 factors,	 all	 of	 which	 pre-date	
industrialization,	 Britain	 could	 not	 have	 been	 reasonably	 expected	 to	 follow	 the	
French	pattern.		His	observations	here	approximate	Aristide	Zolberg’s	(2009)	view	











accuses	 us,	 we—once	 again—explicitly and categorically rejected it”	 (Anderson	
1966:	 10;	 emphasis	 in	 original).	 But	 Anderson	 then	 proceeds	 to	 take	 aim	 at	
















	 If	 the	 Anderson	 thesis	 is	 reductionist,	 it	 is	 far	 less	 so	 than	 some	 of	 his	
contemporaries—for	example	James	Hinton,	who	criticized	Anderson	“for	assertion	
of	 primacy	 to	 the	 political	 and	 ideological	 factors”—practically	 the	 opposite	 of	
Thompson’s	 critique.	 Anderson	 is	 somewhere	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 spectrum	 of	
class	 formation	 literature,	 distant	 from	 both	 the	 economic	 determinist	 and	 the	





more	strongly	 than	 they	actually	meant,	 in	opposition	 to	 the	determinism	of	 the	















several	 definitions	 of	 class	 that	 Thompson	 offers	 in	 his	 introduction.	 	 Taken	 out	
of	context,	 it	seems	to	validate	the	structure/agency	dichotomy	that	has	become	
popular	in	recent	years:
Class	 is	 not	 a	 category	 but	 a	 process.	 	 Classes	 arise	 because	 men	 and	






they	 are	 not	 determinative	 (as	 in,	 having	 the	 power	 to	 define	 the	 future).	 	 The	
men	 and	 women	 involved	 in	 the	 struggle	 must	 develop	 an	 understanding	 of	
class	 antagonism,	 but	more	 important	 they	must	 act	 in	 “class	ways.”	 	 Therefore,	
class	happens	as	 a	 result	of	 emergence	of	 class-based	activity.	 	 Thompson	deftly	





															In	History and Class Consciousness,	Georg	Lukács	famously	distinguished	
between	 class-in-itself	 and	 class-for-itself.	 	 The	 former	 refers	 to	 the	 “objective”	
identity	 of	 the	working	 class,	 as	 determined	 by	 productive	 relations.	 	 The	 latter	





his	 strongest	 moments,	 Thompson	 seems	 to	 completely	 reject	 the	 “objective”	
dimension	of	class,	in	favor	of	its	“subjective”	component.
	 Criticisms	 of	 Thompson	 often	 attack	 a	 gross	 caricature	 of	 his	 actual	
argument.	 	 Thompson	 did	 not	 ignore	 the	 real,	 grounded,	 “objective”	 conditions	
of	 class	 formation—in	 fact,	 he	 remained	 keenly	 aware	 of	 their	 continued	
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importance.	 	 Likewise,	 he	 did	 not	 present	 class	 as	 a	 mythical,	 free-floating	
concept.	 	But	 in	 granting	 the	primacy	of	 cultural	 components	of	 class	 formation,	
Thompson	apparently	challenged	a	sacred	dogma	of	Marxist	orthodoxy.

























portend	 a	 left	 reading	 of	 Anderson’s	 defense	 of	 Althusser’s	 structuralism	 against	
Thompson’s	 (now	 somewhat	 less	 trendy)	 Marxist	 humanism?	 	 Or	 is	 Anderson’s	
Althusser	significantly	different	from	the	Althusser	that	has	recently	been	embraced	
by	the	academic	left?		These	questions	deserve	further	analysis.
	 Althusser	 is	 often	 cast	 as	 a	 crude	 economic	 determinist.	 	 Imprudent	
statements	 like	 the	 following	 lend	 credence	 to	 that	 characterization:	 “The	 class	
struggle	does	not	go	on	 in	 the	air	…	 it	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	mode	of	production	and	
exploitation	 in	 a	 given	 class	 society.	 The	 emphasis	 reverts	 continually	 towards	
the	economic	base.	To	contend	that	social	formations	typically	derive	their	unity	
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to	classes	within	it,	and	distributing	the	agents	within	each	class”	(Anderson	1978:	
55).	 	But	Althusser’s	 intention	was	not	to	position	the	economy	at	the	center	of	
social	 life,	even	 if	 some	of	his	 statements,	when	 taken	out	of	 context,	 give	 that	
impression.		Rather,	he	will	best	be	remembered	for	his	questioning	the	primacy	
of	 the	 Hegelian	 subject,	 and	 his	 contributions	 to	 the	 revival	 of	 anti-humanist	
philosophy.			
		 Althusser	famously	posited	an	“epistemological	break”	between	the	naively	
humanist	“early	Marx”	(of	the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844)	and	
the	more	sophisticated	“late	Marx”	(of	Capital).	 	 In	his	view,	the	authentic	Marx	















but	Anderson	was	not	 one	of	 them.	 	 Indeed,	 if	 one	desired	 to	 attack	Althusser	
vicariously	via	one	of	his	 followers,	one	could	hardly	have	picked	a	worse	target	
than	Anderson.
	 Indeed,	 the	cultural	studies	baton	would	be	passed	off	 in	the	 late	1970s	
and	 early	 1980s	 to	 Stuart	 Hall’s	 Centre	 for	 Cultural	 Studies,	 who	 attempted	 a	
synthesis	 of	 Thompsonian	 cultural	 history	 along	 with	 (their	 own	 version)	 of	
Althusserianism.	 	 There	were	 important	methodological	 differences	between	 the	
Thompson	and	Hall	camps,	which	exacerbated	antagonisms	on	both	sides.	Rather	
than	pouring	over	historical	documents,	as	Thompson	had	done	in	preparing	MEWC	
and	 his	 other	 major	 works,	 Hall’s	 followers	 tended	 to	 be	 theoretically	 oriented,	
shunning	painstaking	empiricism	in	favor	of	pure	theory.
	 There	is	a	danger	that	the	entire	debate	might	be	reduced	to	a	question	
of	 free	 will	 versus	 determinism	 (or	 what	 sociologists	 often	 call	 “structure	 vs.	
agency”).	 	 The	 reality	 is	 both	more	 sophisticated,	 and	more	 petty,	 and	 not	 only	
because	 neither	 Anderson	 nor	 Thompson	 are	 adequate	 representatives	 of	 these	
respective	“positions.”		Although	Thompson	is	clearly	aligned	with	the	“agency”	pole,	
his	“deep	historicism”	is	considerably	more	complex.		Thompson	forcefully	asserts	
the	 primacy	 of	 history	 over	 theory,	 and	 makes	 the	 admittedly	 tautological	 case	
that	arguments	about	historiography	can	best	be	evaluated	against	 the	backdrop	
of	historical	fact.	 	What	begins	as	a	defense	of	Marxist	history	quickly	becomes	a	
defense	 of	 the	 historical	 enterprise	 in	 general,	 as	 he	 insists	 on	 the	 determinate	
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properties	of	(historical)	facts.		Thompson’s	attack	is	not	on	theory	per se,	but	on	a	
proto-postmodern	relativism.		Thompson	argues	against	both	crude	empiricism	(he	




	 Thompson’s	position	on	determinacy	 is	 complex	 to	 say	 the	 least.	 	While	
in	 one	 passage	 he	writes,	 “People	were	 so	 hungry	 that	 they	were	willing	 to	 risk	
their	lives	upsetting	a	barrow	of	potatoes.		In	these	conditions,	it	might	appear	more	
surprising	if	men	had	not	plotted	revolutionary	uprisings	than	if	they	had”	(Thompson	
1964:	 592),	 he	 seems	 to	 contradict	 himself	 elsewhere,	 as	when	 he	 critiques	 the	
“abbreviated	 and	 ‘economistic’	 picture	 of	 the	 food	 riot	 as	 a	 direct,	 spasmodic,	
irrational	 response	to	hunger”	 (Thompson	1964:	528).	 	So	as	much	as	Thompson	










	 MEWC	 could	 not	 be	 more	 different	 from	 the	 dominant	 strains	 of	
comparative-historical	 sociology.	 	 	 Thompson	 was	 attacked	 anew	 in	 the	 1980s	
and	 1990s	 by	 a	 new	 generation	 of	 scholars,	 most	 of	 them	 too	 young	 to	 have	
witnessed	his	debates	with	Anderson	firsthand.		Yet	their	critiques	were	very	much	
in	the	tradition	of	Anderson—they	were	methodological	 in	nature.		Craig	Calhoun	
argued	 that	 Thompson	 “does	 not	 much	 examine	 structural positions	 of	 workers	
within	 the	economy	as	a	whole”	 (Calhoun	1982:	21;	my	emphasis).	 The	eminent	
British	sociologist	Anthony	Giddens	similarly	criticized	MEWC	 for	“[collapsing]	the	
spectrum	of	conditions	which	actually	led	to	the	formation	of	the	English	working	








“objective	 situation.”	 	 They	are	 simply	 rehearsing	 the	arguments	Anderson	made	
twenty	years	earlier,	with	only	the	slightest	variation.
	 But	historians	 like	 Thompson	are	under	no	obligation	 to	 generalize,	 and	
Thompson	makes	no	claim	to	comprehensiveness.	 	A	detailed	examination	of	the	




gets	 the	 sense	 that	 Calhoun,	 Giddens,	 Murphy	 and	 Thompson’s	 other	 critics	
are	 superimposing	 their	 own	 set	 of	 sociological	 standards	 over	 of	 a	 completely	
disanalagous	study.		If	Thompson	is	to	be	judged	by	any	standards,	it	is	only	fair	that	
they	be	the	standards	required	by	his	intellectual	project.
	 Similar	 problems	 emerge	 when	 authors	 attempt	 to	 merge	 Thompson	
with	 other	 comparative–historical	 	 luminaries.	 	 For	 example,	 Alvin	 So	 and	
Muhammad	 Hikam	 (1989)	 try	 to	 synthesize	 Thompson	 and	 Wallerstein	 to	
produce	 a	 third,	 composite	 method.	 Although	 exiled	 to	 the	 semi-periphery	 at	
SUNY	 Binghamton,	 Wallerstein’s	 influence	 on	 comparative–historical	 sociology	








	 Eventually,	 So	and	Hakim’s	 true	 intentions	are	 laid	bare—to	 subordinate	
Thompson	to	a	Wallersteinian	approach,	even	as	they	purport	to	remain	faithful	to	
both.		So	and	Hikam	(1989)	accuse	Thompson	of	“a-structural	analysis;	subjectivism;	












emerge.	 	 Despite	 their	 best	 intentions,	 this	 modification	 probably	 creates	 more	
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class	 struggle	 from	 not-yet-class-struggle.	 	 Finally,	 their	 definition	 assumes	 that	
unsuccessful	or	partially	successful	struggle	is	not	actually	class	struggle.
	 But	 there	 is	 another	 problem	 here.	 	 Despite	 MEWC’s	 title,	 Thompson	
acknowledges	that	British	workers	rarely	self-identified	as	a	“working	class.”		Instead,	
they	 used	 the	much	 broader	 descriptor	 “productive	 class.”	 	 This	 term	 refers	 not	
only	to	the	proletariat,	but	to	an	ad	hoc	class	alliance	that	included	petty-bourgeois	
elements	 and	 remnants	 of	 the	 pre-industrial	 era,	 including	 store	 owners,	 small-
time	 manufacturers	 and	 self-employed	 artisans.	 	 Indeed,	 the	 “productive	 class”	
comprised	the	vast	majority	of	British	society,	excluding	only	large	manufacturers,	








But	 to	what	 extent	 does	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 “productive	 class”	 bleed	 into	 Thompson’s	
own	definition	of	the	working	class?		For	Craig	Calhoun,	Thompson’s	loose	definition	
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sociology.		Thompson’s	assertion	that	classes	are	“made”	has	reached	the	point	of	
a	 certain	 orthodoxy	 among	 class	 theorists	 and	 sociologists.	 	 His	 short	 preface	 is	













Thompson	 seemed	 to	 harbor	 a	 deep-seated	 resentment	 toward	 sociology.	 	 His	
introduction	 ranks	 among	 the	 more	 powerful	 and	 angry	 critiques	 of	 sociology	
written	 to	 date.	 	 After	 rereading	 MEWC,	 one	 begins	 to	 wonder	 how	 many	 of	










catches	 almost	 everyone	 in	 the	 ‘working	 people,’	 or	 a	 wide-meshed	 net	 which	
catches	virtually	no	one,	or	what	in	fact	his	‘working	people’	net	does	catch”	(Murphy	
1986:	255).	Of	course,	this	quip	completely	misses	the	point:	Thompson	deliberately	
refuses	to	define	class	 in	a	neat,	bounded,	and	“measurable”	way.	 	This	 is	not	an	
omission	on	his	part,	but	 rather	 is	 characteristic	of	his	overall	method.	 	 It	 seems	






explosion	of	 cultural	 studies,	 science	 studies,	 and	post–second-wave	 feminism	 in	
the	 1980s	 and	 early	 1990s	 briefly	 seemed	 to	 challenge	 the	 positivist	 orthodoxy,	
only	 to	 be	 reabsorbed	 by	 the	 2000s.	 	 Today,	 even	 the	 American	 Sociological	
Association’s	unorthodox	theory	section	is	controlled	by	methodological	positivists.	
Although	 methodological	 positivism	 is	 usually	 associated	 with	 quantitatively-
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oriented	sociologists,	George	Steinmetz	(among	others)	has	argued	that	qualitative	
sociologists	 commit	 the	 same	 crimes	 with	 blunter	 weapons.	 Few	 sociologists	
openly	stake	a	claim	to	the	legacy	of	Auguste	Comte,	but	his	specter	still	haunts	the	
discipline’s	hallowed	halls.		Even	the	most	qualitatively-oriented	sociologists	adhere	
to	methodological	 positivism	 to	 an	 extent	 that	 is	 unmatched	 in	 the	 humanities.	











even	 when	 it	 is	 not	 explicitly	 invoked.	 	 Secondarily,	 positivists	 adopt	 a	 hardline	
scientific	naturalism,	or	the	assumption	that	“the	social	world	can	be	studies	in	the	
same	general	manner	 as	 a	 the	natural	world”	 (2005:	 283).	 In	 the	process,	 social	
scientists	borrow	many	of	the	tools	of	natural	science,	with	its	requisite	emphasis	
on	prediction	and	willful	ignorance	of	concept,	time	and	space	dependence.		Critics	










	 During	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s,	Marxism	was	 eclipsed	 by	 Erik	 Olin	Wright	
and	 the	 self-described	 “analytical”	Marxists,	 whose	 intellectual	 project	 centered	
on	recuperating	Marxist	categories	for	quantitative	sociology.		Countless	gallons	of	
ink	were	 spilled	 on	 such	 critical	 tasks	 as	 “proving”	Marx’s	 labor	 theory	 of	 value,	
as	 though	 the	 successful	 completion	 of	 this	 task	 would	 vindicate	Marxism	 once	





class	 using	 the	 variable	 “socio-economic	 status”	 (SES)—itself	 an	 aggregate	
of	 income,	 net	 assets,	 occupational	 prestige,	 and	 education	 level.	 	 Following	
Thompson,	a	number	of	critical	 sociologists	have	argued	that	while	SES	might	be	
an	adequate	measure	of	 (Weberian)	status,	 it	does	not	accurately	measure	class,	
since	 it	completely	 ignores	 ideology,	consciousness,	and	history—the	“subjective”	
components	 of	 social	 class.	 	 Of	 course,	 “class	 consciousness”	 never	 appears	 on	
the	General	Social	Survey	and	would	be	difficult	to	 input	 into	SPSS.	 	“Measuring”	




	 For	 these	 reasons,	 as	 impressive	 as	 MEWC	 is,	 it	 might	 not	 meet	 the	
standards	of	academic	rigor	that	pervade	contemporary	sociology.		As	a	discipline,	
sociology	has	a	 structuralist	bias.	 	Even	“cultural	 sociologists”	have	drawn	the	 ire	
of	“cultural	studies”	scholars	(often	located	in	the	humanities)	for	overemphasizing	
the	 structural	 dimension	 of	 social	 life.	 	 One	 even	wonders	 if	MEWC	would	 even	
meet	the	minimum	expectations	of	a	typical	dissertation	committee.		 If	there	is	a	
single	defining	characteristic	of	sociology,	it	is	the	impulse	to	build	models,	create	
categories	 and	 generalize	 across	multiple	 cases.	 	Only	 the	postmodernists	 at	 the	
fringe	 of	 the	 discipline	 have	 completely	 rejected	 generalization	 as	 a	 worthwhile	
strategy.	 	 The	 sociologist	who	 rejects	 the	discipline’s	holy	 triumvirate—modeling,	
generalization,	and	comparison—is	by	most	accounts	not	a	sociologist	at	all.
	 The	 other	 problem	 with	 Thompson’s	 method	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	
mainstream	 social	 science	 is	 his	 understanding	 of	 time.	 	 While	 statisticians	 can	
compare	 fixed	 points	 along	 a	 timeline	 (using	 a	 time-series	 analysis	 or	 a	 cohort	
study),	they	cannot	easily	measure	the	dynamic	nature	of	historical	processes.		But,	
of	course,	historical	processes	(like	class	formation)	are	constantly	in	transition.		As	




the	 other	 hand,	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 of	 temporality	 in	 Thompson’s	 writing	 that	 few	
















	 One	final	question	 remains:	what	use	do	sociologists	have	 for	history?	 	 If	
Thompson’s	 MEWC	 is	 only	 tolerable	 when	 eviscerated	 and	 subsumed	 under	 the	
rubric	 of	 a	 demonstrably	 sociological	 frame,	 what	 is	 it	 actually	 worth	 on its own 
terms?	 	 The	most	prominent	 comparative–historical	 sociologists—Moore,	 Skocpol,	
Tilly,	Wallerstein—wield	 grand	 theory	 like	 a	 sledgehammer.	 	 Similarly,	 Anderson’s	
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essays,	 along	 with	 his	 masterworks	 Lineages	 and	 Passages	 are	 predicated	













and	 articles	 spanning	 five	 years.	 In	 chronological	 order,	 they	 are	 Thompson’s	 book	Making 
of the English Working Class (1964,	hereafter	MEWC);	Anderson’s	 review	article	“Origins	of	
the	Present	Crisis”	(1964)	in	the	New Left Review	(hereafter	“Origins”);	Thompson’s	response	
“Peculiarities	of	the	English”	(1965)	in	the	Socialist Register,	later	republished	with	minor	edits	in	
an	essay	collection	entitled	The Poverty of Theory 1978	(hereafter	Poverty);	Anderson’s	rebuttal	
“Socialism	and	Pseudo-Empiricism”	(1966)	in	the	New Left Review	(hereafter	“Socialism”);	and	







3	 	 	 If	Anderson	were	to	update	his	piece	today,	he	might	note	that	Britain	has	 led	 the	pack	









revolution	 dissolves	 into	 a	 series	 of	 events	 that	 stretches	 back	 to	 the	 twelfth	 century	 and	
continues,	 as	 an	 ongoing	 process,	 until	 the	 nineteenth	 century.	 For	 Anderson,	 the	 English	
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aristocracy	remained	well	into	the	nineteenth	and	twentieth	centuries	(in	the	sociological,	not	
titular	sense).
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